Why We Built the Ivory Tower
By Stanley Fish--New York Times, 05/21/04
After nearly five decades in academia, and five and a half years as a dean
at a public university, I exit with a three-part piece of wisdom for those who
work in higher education: do your job; don't try to do someone else's job, as
you are unlikely to be qualified; and don't let anyone else do your job. In
other words, don't confuse your academic obligations with the obligation to
save the world; that's not your job as an academic; and don't surrender your
academic obligations to the agenda of any non-academic constituency — parents,
legislators, trustees or donors. In short, don't cross the boundary between
academic work and partisan advocacy, whether the advocacy is yours or someone
else's.
Marx famously said that our job is not to interpret the world, but to
change it. In the academy, however, it is exactly the reverse: our job is not
to change the world, but to interpret it. While academic labors might in some
instances play a role in real-world politics — if, say, the Supreme Court
cites your book on the way to a decision — it should not be the design or aim
of academics to play that role.
While academics in general will agree that a university should not dance to
the tune of external constituencies, they will most likely resist the
injunction to police the boundary between academic work and political work.
They will resist because they simply don't believe in the boundary — they
believe that all activities are inherently political, and an injunction to
avoid politics is meaningless and futile.
Now there is some truth to that, but it is not a truth that goes very far.
And it certainly doesn't go where those who proclaim it would want it to go.
It is true that no form of work — including even the work of, say, natural
science — stands apart from the political, social and economic concerns that
underlie the structures and practices of a society. This does not mean,
however, that there is no difference between academic labors and partisan
labors, or that there is no difference between, for example, analyzing the
history of welfare reform — a history that would necessarily include opinions
pro and con — and urging students to go out and work for welfare reform or for
its reversal.
Analyzing welfare reform in an academic context is a political action in
the sense that any conclusion a scholar might reach will be one another
scholar might dispute. (That, after all, is what political means: subject to
dispute.) But such a dispute between scholars will not be political in the
everyday sense of the word, because each side will represent different
academic approaches, not different partisan agendas.
My point is not that academics should refrain from being political in an
absolute sense — that is impossible — but that they should engage in politics
appropriate to the enterprise they signed onto. And that means arguing about
(and voting on) things like curriculum, department leadership, the direction
of research, the content and manner of teaching, establishing standards —
everything that is relevant to the responsibilities we take on when we accept
a paycheck. These responsibilities include meeting classes, keeping up in the
discipline, assigning and correcting papers, opening up new areas of
scholarship, and so on.
This is a long list, but there are many in academia who would add to it the
larger (or so they would say) tasks of "forming character" and "fashioning
citizens." A few years ago, the presidents of nearly 500 universities issued a
declaration on the "Civic Responsibility of Higher Education." It called for
colleges and universities to take responsibility for helping students "realize
the values and skills of our democratic society."
Derek Bok, the former president of Harvard and one of the forces behind the
declaration, has urged his colleagues to "consider civic responsibility as an
explicit and important aim of college education." In January, some 1,300
administrators met in Washington under the auspices of the Association of
American Colleges and Universities to take up this topic: "What practices
provide students with the knowledge and commitments to be socially responsible
citizens?" That's not a bad question, but the answers to it should not be the
content of a college or university course.
This is so not because these practices are political, but because they are
the political tasks that belong properly to other institutions. Universities
could engage in moral and civic education only by deciding in advance which of
the competing views of morality and citizenship is the right one, and then
devoting academic resources and energy to the task of realizing it. But that
task would deform (by replacing) the true task of academic work: the search
for truth and the dissemination of it through teaching.
The idea that universities should be in the business of forming character
and fashioning citizens is often supported by the claim that academic work
should not be hermetically sealed or kept separate from the realm of values.
But the search for truth is its own value, and fidelity to it mandates the
accompanying values of responsibility in pedagogy and scholarship.
Performing academic work responsibly and at the highest level is a job big
enough for any scholar and for any institution. And, as I look around, it does
not seem to me that we academics do that job so well that we can now take it
upon ourselves to do everyone else's job too. We should look to the practices
in our own shop, narrowly conceived, before we set out to alter the entire
world by forming moral character, or fashioning democratic citizens, or
combating globalization, or embracing globalization, or anything else.
One would like to think that even the exaggerated sense of virtue that is
so much a part of the academic mentality has its limits. If we aim low and
stick to the tasks we are paid to perform, we might actually get something
done.